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Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law, by Jean Porter. 
Grand Rapids, MI, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005. Pp. 
xii and 400. $32.00 paper.
DAVID A. HORNER, Biola University and Centers for Christian Study, 
International
In her previous book, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for 
Christian Ethics, Notre Dame moral theologian, Jean Porter, collected and 
elucidated a rich array of medieval sources of refl ection on the natural 
moral law. In Nature and Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law she 
draws upon those resources to construct a positive theory of natural law 
that is grounded in a medieval, particularly Thomistic, conception, but is 
developed and extended in signifi cant and insightful ways. The result is 
a substantive work of natural law theory that makes signifi cant contribu-
tions to issues such as the interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of 
law, virtue, action, and practical reason; the history and interpretation of 
natural law thought; human rights and the natural law tradition; the re-
lation of teleological, deontological and virtue aspects of ethics; and the 
relation between theological and philosophical ethics. Nature and Reason 
is a mature work; unhurried, confi dent, detailed, wide-ranging, and gra-
cious to interlocutors. 
Porter aims to set forth a natural law theory that is importantly distinct 
from much of the natural law thinking of the modern period (beginning 
with Hobbes and Grotius and including contemporary theorists, e.g., the 
“Finnis-Grisez” perspective put forward by John Finnis, Germain Grisez 
and others), while refl ecting, broadly, the approach of Aquinas and other 
scholastics. (By “scholastics” Porter refers specifi cally to theologians and 
canon lawyers of the twelth and thirteenth centuries.) I shall comment on 
three areas where Porter distinguishes her theory from various “modern” 
alternatives.
Porter sees her theory as distinct, fi rst, in that her aim is not to discover 
norms that are drawn from universally self-evident principles which all 
persons of good will, regardless of culture or worldview, will accept. In-
deed, on her view, the scholastics understood the natural law not primar-
ily as a set of rules of conduct, but as a capacity for moral discernment, or 
the fundamental principles through which such a capacity operates (p. 5). 
Following this conception, Porter’s “account of the natural law will not pro-
vide a basis for deriving moral norms from indubitable fi rst principles. It 
will, however, provide a framework for analyzing, critiquing, and develop-
ing norms and practices within a context of practical concerns” (pp. 45–46). 
In fact, however, Porter provides more than merely a framework; she goes 
on to develop a substantive, albeit general natural law account of morality. 
But she sees more “particular moralities” or specifi c moral visions or value 
systems as the product of social refl ection on the exigencies of practical life, 
and thus, in some measure, conventional. Indeed, according to Porter, the 
scholastics “rejected Aristotle’s approach to natural law, according to which 
social norms are immediate and organic expressions of human nature, in 
favor of a Ciceronian approach that gives a central role to rational refl ection 
and social construction” (p. 125; cf. pp. 8–9). Porter’s aim, then, is to give a 
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plausible account of this approach to ethics, which honors both its natural 
and constructive aspects.
Second, relatedly, Porter presents an explicitly theological account of the 
natural law. This does not, however, involve a kind of “divine command” 
theory or the assumption that the natural law is relative to or only known 
by those who share Christian theological assumptions. Scholastic ethics 
presupposes a kind of ethical naturalism, on Porter’s account, according 
to which 
human morality in all its culturally diverse forms is an expression 
of the distinctive inclinations and activities proper to the human 
animal, especially (but not only) the distinctive forms of human 
social behavior. As such, morality should be understood fi rst of all 
as a natural phenomenon, “natural” in contrast to “transcenden-
tally grounded” or “implicitly divine.” At the same time, human 
morality in all its diverse forms refl ects the goodness of the human 
creature, and as such it is an expression of God’s will that creatures 
should exist and fl ourish—whatever we are to say more specifi cally 
about the substance of particular moralities. (pp. 126–27)
The natural moral law, on this account, is grounded in the Christian doc-
trines of creation and providence (understood as God’s teleological order-
ing of the cosmos, e.g., by creating real natures with distinct ends). For 
Porter, the characteristically modern att empt to derive moral norms from 
fi rst principles that are abstracted from all metaphysical or theological 
content is an impossible task, as well as incompatible with its scholastic 
roots. In their natural law thinking the scholastics brought specifi c, and 
specifi cally theological, understandings to bear in their refl ections on hu-
man nature, inclinations, and action. At the same time they saw the subject 
of their refl ection as real, universal, human nature. Porter seeks to honor 
these diﬀ erent strands in formulating her account, and she is impressively 
successful, in my view. 
Still, Porter consistently distances her theory from claims to universal-
ity, which is initially puzzling, given the robust natural ethical theory that 
she develops. There are (at least) two referents of “universal” applicable 
here: the (metaphysical) ground of moral statements or rules and the (epis-
temological) acceptance of them. They are separable. If there is indeed a 
real human nature, as Porter argues, then the ground of morality is indeed 
universal—the same for all human beings. And if this is true, then it is true 
whether or not all or any humans believe it. Similar implications follow 
for the specifi cally theological content of a Christian natural law theory. 
Porter seems to be particularly concerned about the epistemological prob-
lem of moral pluralism, which is indeed important (although I think that 
the distance between “particular moralities” is not as great as Porter some-
times supposes; see pp. 181, 229–30). But her account of nature identifi es 
a very plausible basis for holding that there is a universal (but general) 
ground of morality, and that is certainly an important beginning.
Third, at the center of Porter’s account of natural law is her att empt 
to recover a scholastic understanding of the roles of nature and reason 
in the natural moral law. Porter rejects two types of modern natural law 
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approach, both those that seek to infer ethical conclusions directly from 
“human nature,” understood as human (biological) capacities and func-
tions, and those that reject the drawing of any ethical implications from 
human “prerational” nature, and seek rather to derive moral norms 
entirely from the deliverances of practical reason. The two approaches 
refl ect divergent understandings of human nature; in Albert the Great’s 
terminology, the fi rst emphasizes human “nature as nature” and the sec-
ond, human “nature as reason.” Both understandings have scholastic 
roots and each identifi es something important to an adequate natural 
law theory. But, according to Porter, the two modern approaches to natu-
ral law based upon them (as characterized above) are inadequate. Both 
nature and reason, properly understood, are necessary. To spell out such 
an account is, in short, Porter’s project. 
In chapter 2 Porter analyzes “nature as nature.” According to Porter, the 
scholastics do appeal to the natural inclinations of human beings (e.g., for 
life and reproduction) as being morally signifi cant. But they do not derive 
ethical norms directly from observations about those inclinations, or from 
conclusions about the natural teleology of particular organs or functions. 
Such approaches not only fall prey to what Porter sees as the grain of 
truth formulated in the so-called naturalistic fallacy, but they are explicitly 
rejected by the scholastics, and so can hardly lay claim to the tradition. (I 
have heard philosophers criticize natural law ethics because they suppose 
that it entails that it would be immoral for a human to walk on his hands, 
since that does not correspond to the natural function of the hands. But 
as Porter points out, Aquinas uses this very example as a foil, in order to 
distinguish his own understanding of natural law from the kind of facile 
approach that would produce such a conclusion. See p. 76.) 
The scholastic approach to nature involves refl ection about human 
natural inclinations, and it is, indeed, teleological, according to Porter: but 
with respect to the broader picture of human fl ourishing, not to particular 
organs and functions. “Their analysis is teleological, in the sense that it pre-
supposes some account of what human life considered as a whole should 
look like and what purposes the diﬀ erent inclinations and functions of hu-
man life serve within that context” (p. 77). Teleological reasoning of this 
kind introduces metaphysical (and theological) considerations that mod-
ern approaches seek to avoid. Porter sets her task, then, to defend such a 
view—fi rst of all, as a proper interpretation of Aquinas (against, e.g., the 
“Finnis-Grisez” interpretation, which denies that Aquinas makes appeal to 
metaphysical considerations in grounding his norms), and then as a plau-
sible realist or essentialist view of nature that can be sustained against anti-
essentialist critiques and in light of evolutionary biology. Porter’s extensive 
account of these matt ers is rich, insightful, and in my view, persuasive.
The kind of ethical naturalism that this picture expresses, however, is 
inadequate, as it stands, to ground a more substantive and specifi c mor-
al vision. Porter asserts repeatedly that human nature, seen in this way, 
underdetermines moral norms or more specifi c ethical conceptions and 
practices. We cannot simply “read them oﬀ ” of “prerational” human na-
ture. Nature provides starting points, constraints, and directions for these 
norms, but they need to be developed by rational refl ection into particular 
moral visions (the “conventional” aspect of morality). This process relates 
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to the second understanding of human nature, “nature as reason,” and is 
the topic of chapter 4. 
Porter argues that moral norms cannot be derived from practical rea-
son simply as such, abstracted from all metaphysical or theological under-
standings or commitments, and that the scholastics did not hold that they 
could or should be. Porter critiques a broad array of att empts to ground 
morality in this way, from Kantian-type commitments to the autonomy of 
morality, to sentimentalist and consequentialist varieties of instrumental 
reasoning. On Porter’s view, the “Finnis-Grisez” interpretation of Aquinas 
is a version of the Kantian-type approach, and she critiques it extensively, 
both as an account of morality and as an interpretation of Aquinas. Scho-
lastics such as Aquinas did conceive of morality as essentially involving a 
kind of ordering rationality, i.e., as being a kind of “law” drawn from fi rst 
principles that are immediately grasped, or known through themselves 
(per se nota). But this does not mean that Aquinas held to a view according 
to which morality is autonomous, grounded wholly in practical reason 
itself, and in no way dependent upon factual or metaphysical truths. “For 
Aquinas, in contrast, the fi rst principles of practical reason are nothing 
other than the rational creature’s grasp of the intelligibilities inherent in 
created existence, tout court or as expressed in some specifi c form of cre-
ated being” (p. 263).
The “nature” and “reason” aspects of Porter’s natural law theory are 
brought together in her conceptions of virtue and happiness (the subjects 
of chapter 3). Our refl ections on human nature as such lead us to a general 
normative ideal of human fl ourishing, which Porter calls “well-being.” 
Again, such a conception will underdetermine a specifi c moral vision. 
What is needed, further, is a distinctively moral ideal that specifi es and 
qualifi es well-being; a conception of what Porter calls “happiness,” or the 
complete, including moral, perfection of human nature. Thus, Aquinas’s 
understanding of natural law, on Porter’s account, is both teleological and 
eudaimonistic. It is teleological in that “it is developed and structured 
through refl ection on the purpose, or end, of human life, and the way 
this end incorporates and brings order to the diverse inclinations of our 
complex specifi c nature” (pp. 49–50). It is eudaimonistic in that this end is 
understood to be the perfection of human nature (Porter describes Aqui-
nas as synthesizing the scholastic natural tradition with Aristotelian eu-
daimonism, p. 322). “The concept of happiness is central to a Thomistic 
theory of the natural law because it provides a framework within which 
to integrate two dimensions of human existence, namely, human nature 
comprehensively understood and the distinctively human character of 
natural existence, that is to say, human reason” (p. 143).
What (terrestrial) happiness is, according to Aquinas, is living accord-
ing to virtue. Thus it is an account of the virtues that gives specifi c content 
to a natural law morality. Porter’s Thomistic conception of natural law 
promises to bridge the gulf between deontological (law-oriented) and vir-
tue ethics. “Understood in this way, a Thomistic theory of the natural law 
is not at odds with a virtue-oriented approach to morality; indeed this 
theory of the natural law is a theory of virtue” (p. 323).
Porter’s distinction between well-being and happiness (Aquinas does 
not make this distinction) is both motivated by her general account and 
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suggestive in several areas. One is in addressing the broadly Aristotelian 
vs. Stoic dispute over the relation between happiness and enjoyment. Can 
one, by acting virtuously, suﬀ er genuine harm (and thus not experience 
fl ourishing in the sense of well-being), and still be “happy” in the mor-
ally rich sense of fl ourishing? On Porter’s interpretation of Aquinas, the 
answer is a qualifi ed, “yes.” Happiness and well-being are not equated; 
the att ainment of well-being is neither necessary nor suﬃ  cient for happi-
ness. However, the happy life is normally and properly an enjoyable life; 
the virtues and the capacities that they perfect are in fact aimed at the full 
functioning of human nature, i.e., well-being. Such a view, says Porter, 
“is at least suggestive that the joys and pleasures of the happy life are 
intimately bound up with enjoyment of those goods which are proper to 
the life of well-being” (p. 173). (Put diﬀ erently, Aquinas’s understanding 
of value does not, as some forms of consequentialism, reduce moral goods 
(happiness) to non-moral goods (well-being); yet it is able to account for 
the real goodness of the latt er as well as its relation to the former.) 
In Nature as Reason, Porter has added signifi cantly to the goods to be 
enjoyed in thinking about the natural law.
The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke, by John W. Yolton. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. $35.00 (cloth)
JEANINE GRENBERG, St. Olaf College
John Yolton takes on a diﬃ  cult task in this book: to convince us that John 
Locke is not simply an empiricist, but that his thought is deeply and 
centrally informed by more speculative and conjectural, even religious 
and theological, concerns. Yolton is intrigued by pervasive references in 
Locke’s Essay and other works to “things obscure, hidden, and even noble 
and beautiful,” (p. 139) and this book is his eﬀ ort to convince us of the 
centrality of such things in Locke’s philosophy.
Yolton’s audience is thus “those who still cling to labeling Locke ‘em-
piricist’ (of whom there are fewer today),” (p. 137) and also those who 
tend to assume that Locke was interested only in att acking and reject-
ing central Christian doctrines. (p.  151) At the center of Yolton’s att ack 
against a narrowly empiricist and secular interpretation of Locke is the 
claim that Locke is in fact concerned with two “intellectual worlds”, one 
the more familiar, materialistic world accessed via sense experience and 
observation; the other a less att ended to Lockean world of “God, angels 
and spirits” accessed (or more accurately, imagined or thought of) via 
speculation and conjecture.
I am torn in trying to assess Yolton’s success in this task. On the one 
hand, we are indebted to him for uncovering a host of interesting tex-
tual references in Locke’s works which suggest of Locke escaping his 
empiricist bounds, and which enigmatically hint at a Lockean concern 
for this second, more spiritual, intellectual world. For example, in the 
Fourth Book of the Essay, Locke speaks of the goal of “natural philoso-
